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C.I.A. Trained Tibetans in Colorado, New Book

Says

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 18—

The Central Intelligence Agency set up a secret base in the Colorado Rockies to train Tibetan guerrillas in mountain warfare in the late nineteen-fifties, when there was an uprising against Chinese rule in Tibet, a new book discloses.

In the book, "The Politics of Lying," David Wise, the author, said that the agency began training Tibetan refugees recruited in India in 1958 in a deserted World War II Army base near Leadville, Colo. The operation continued into the early months of the Kennedy Administration, he said.

A spokesman for the agency said that there would be no immediate comment on the report.

Mr. Wise, the former Washington bureau chief of The New York Herald Tribune and co-author of "The Invisible Government," a 1964 book about the Central Intelligence Agency, wrote that the Tibetan training program apparently ended abruptly in December, 1961, six months after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and a few days after its cover was almost blown in an airport near Colorado Springs.


Delayed by Bus Accident

"Ironically, it was the snow and the mountains — the very factors that led the C.I.A. to select Colorado for the training base — that almost caused the operation to surface," Mr. Wise wrote. A group of Tibetan trainees were loaded aboard a bus at the Army camp for a 130-mile trip to a nearby airfield in Colorado Springs, where a large Air Force jet was waiting to quietly fly them out of the country before dawn.

"But coming down the mountain," Mr. Wise wrote, "the bus skidded off the road in the snow. As a result of the delay caused by the accident, it was daylight when the Tibetans arrived at the field."

Once there, the book went on, overzealous military security officials herded the airport's employees around at gunpoint, but not until at least one of them saw the Tibetans board the jet.

Complaints to the local sheriff were made about the manhandling of the civilians, and a few newspaper articles describing the bizarre encounter were published in Colorado Springs and Denver. But, Mr. Wise wrote, the full implications of the episode did not become public.



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Camp reportedly was in Rockies 130 miles from city of Colorado Springs.

When a reporter for The New York Times subsequently began a routine inquiry, based on a brief news-agency dispatch about the incident, the book said, the office of Robert S. McNamara, who was then Secretary of Defense, telephoned the Washington Bureau of The Times and asked that the story not be used because of "national security" reasons. The Times acquiesced, Mr. Wise wrote, in line with the general newspaper practice in those years of not challenging the Government's definition of "national security."

The two top news officials in Washington for The Times in 1961, the bureau chief, James Reston, and the news editor, Wallace Carroll, said yesterday that they did not recall the incident. Mr. Reston is now a vice president and columnist for The Times, and Mr. Carroll is editor and publisher of the Journal and Sentinel in Winston-Salem, N. C.

Jack Raymond, who was defense correspondent for The Times in 1961, said yesterday that "I do remember at the time knowing about the incident and I don't recall what prevented me from writing about it."

Mr. Raymond, who is now associated with the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies in New York, added in a telephone interview, "I'm inclined to think that I didn't have enough information about it to write a story. I have no immediate recollection of being thrown off the story by anybody."

'Nerve-Racking Moments'

In his book, Mr. Wise wrote that the issue caused some "nerve-racking moments" at the Central Intelligence

Agency's new \$46-million headquarters in Langley, Va., because the incident occurred a week after President Kennedy announced the appointment of John A. McCone as the new Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. McCone replaced Allen W. Dulles, whose resignation was accepted after the Bay of Pigs incident, Mr. Wise wrote.

The dispute between Tibet and China began in the 13th century, Mr. Wise wrote, with China periodically claiming Tibet as part of her territory. Mainland China was taken over by Communist forces led by Mao Tse-tung in 1949, and in 1950 Chinese troops marched into Tibet.

In May, 1951, the Chinese signed an agreement with the Dalai Lama government for the occupation of Tibet, pledging not to alter the existing political system in Tibet or the powers of the Dalai Lama. However, the agreement also provided for Chinese control through the appointment of a military and administrative committee.

During the mid-nineteen-fifties, however, Mr. Wise wrote, Tibetan guerrillas began

insurgent warfare against the Chinese and officials of the Central Intelligence Agency "concluded that the situation offered an ideal opportunity for covert United States aid."

In March, 1959, the Dalai Lama was forced to flee over high mountain passes to India after a Chinese mortar attack on his palace. Mr. Wise asserted, Intelligence officials later concluded, Mr. Wise wrote, that some of the guerrillas who had been trained in the Colorado Rockies had been responsible for guiding the Dalai Lama to safety.

Open warfare broke out in Tibet after the escape, Mr. Wise reported, and thousands of Tibetans were killed and the Dalai Lama's government was dissolved by the Chinese. India's decision to grant sanctuary to the Dalai Lama also increased the pressure between

that nation and China, the book said.

The secret training operation was hardly a success, Mr. Wise wrote, because the guerrillas "infiltrated into Tibet by the C.I.A. were attempting to harass the Chinese, not to free the country; in the long run it is doubtful that they made very much difference. Since 1961 Communist China has tightened its grip on Tibet." Tibet, like other areas largely populated by ethnic minorities, now has the status of an autonomous region within China.

"Would the nation's security have been endangered if the story of the Tibetan operation had been disclosed in 1961?" the book asked. "In the wake of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy ordered two separate investigations of the C.I.A., and he struggled to take tighter control over the agency's operations by changing its top leadership."

"Publication of the story might have focused public attention on a number of important issues," Mr. Wise suggested, "including the basic question of whether tax money would be used to finance clandestine intelligence operations." A second issue, he added, was whether the agency had a legal basis for operating a secret training base in the United States.

Finally, Mr. Wise wrote, that "disclosure might also have led to a public examination of such important questions as whether President Eisenhower approved the Tibetan operation, whether President Kennedy was aware of it or approved it, and whether the four 'watchdog' committees of the Congress had had any knowledge of what was going on in Colorado."

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Oil for Arms

Earlier in the year the Shah of Iran was "standing up" to the big oil companies and making headlines. With a population of 30 million, Iran produces some 4.5 million barrels a day, amounting to yearly revenues of about \$4 billion. The consortium which is extracting the oil includes Shell; Texaco; Mobil; the new little brother, Exxon; British Petroleum; Cie. Française des Petroles; some U.S. independents, etc. Their contract for the concession expired in 1979, but it contained an option for renewal for another fifteen years, which would have extended it to 1994. The Shah decided not to honor the renewal clause. He announced that he was not satisfied with the present level of production—he wanted it doubled, no less. This would entail a capital investment on the part of the companies of at least \$2 billion, hardly a safe venture under present conditions, with perhaps worse to come. The Shah was threatening complete nationalization by 1979, with the companies in the consortium relegated to the position of customers for the oil output, in what looks like a sellers' market.

Here, to a superficial view, was another case of the puppet threatening the puppeteer. The CIA had put the Shah in power. When Mohammed Mossadegh opposed him in the early 1950s, the Shah fled the country, and found it safe to return only when Allen Dulles deposed Mossadegh with the aid of \$19 million distributed in the right places. Though that was long ago, on closer inspection things are not so different now. The CIA, to be sure, can no longer engage in the rough stuff which was the rule in the fifties, and to that extent the puppet is no longer that much of a puppet, but deals can still be made when the right people are on hand to make them.

Like Richard Helms, for instance. Until recently he was head of the CIA; then it was announced by the White House that he would become ambassador to Iran. This seemed like an act of kindness; though shorn of power, a faithful public servant was rewarded with an ambassadorship. But there was more to it than that. The Shah had attended the exclusive Le Rosey school in Switzerland, and he and Richard Helms had been classmates. Of course the old school tie could avail only so far, but Helms knew his way around in Iran, and in oil.

If the Shah's confrontation with the oil companies was not wholly phony, neither was he biting the hand that had fed him—the hand of the United States. Not that, on his record, the Shah would hesitate to bite if such action offered him a real advantage, but the United States is by far the most powerful military nation in the world, and the chief arms supplier. The Shah has agreed to buy between \$2.5 billion and \$3 billion in arms from Uncle Sam, and to pay cash on the oil barrel head—"the biggest single arms deal ever arranged by the Pentagon" (John W. Finney, *The New York Times*, February 22). This is convenient for both sides. It will help the United States in its chronic balance-of-payments problem. Second, it will help keep certain of our arms manufacturers in trim, now that they face some cutbacks in other directions.

It will do nothing for the Iranian people, whom the Shah will continue to rule as a feudal lord. The great majority of Iranians are desperately poor and some of them, university students in particular, are in a rebellious mood. When they are caught by the Shah's police they are jailed, tortured and put to death, depending on the enormity of the offense. However, dissidents abroad are a long-term threat. In February a Republic of Iran was proclaimed in Washington by a Committee for Free Iran, whose demands include freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, the end of the police state, and an end of the monarchy.

It is hardly likely that the Shah needs several billion dollars worth of arms to cope with his internal enemies, and the government in exile is not a formidable threat at present. But it asks awkward questions in its newspaper, *Iran Free Press*: "Why must a country like Iran, with a majority of its citizens impoverished and facing no real military threat from the outside, spend billions on armaments?" The paper charges that any country with an investment in Iran can bleed the Iranian people and deprive them of the necessities of life. Moreover, the arms—fighter bombers, patrol planes, helicopters, etc.—can be used to establish the Shah as the master of the Persian Gulf, from which the British withdrew in 1971. With the arms supplied by the United States (some also by the British) the Shah can dominate the other oil-rich countries in the area, and the United States is apparently satisfied to see him establish himself in that role.

The Iranian students in the United States have no love for their ruler, and it is possible that they will try to give him a lively reception on his forthcoming visit to the United States. What with the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and the Marines; the CIA, the FBI, the Washington police, et al., the Shah has little to worry about. Law and order will be maintained, we may be sure of that. But in the long run, the outlook for the type of government the Shah represents—and the United States supports—may be no brighter than that of similar tyrannies that have come and gone.

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APR 6 1973

MEMPHIS PRESS-SCIMITAR, FRIDAY, APRIL 6, 1973

Friday Book Report

Startling Charges Levelled at 'Secret Team

Machine'

By MENNO DUERKSEN
Press-Scimitar Staff Writer

Most Americans would recoil with horror at the idea of a military junta aiming cannon at the White House and taking over the U.S. government, South America style, but if we may believe a retired Air Force colonel named L. Fletcher Prouty, it has already happened in Washington, without the guns.

The disturbing and frightening factor is that Prouty



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has the credentials, having served for nine years as contact man between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon, plus a well documented 400 pages to back up the sub-title of his new book, "The CIA and its allies in control of the United States and the world."

The book is "The Secret Intelligence-Hall, Inc.;

Incomplete as received

"Secret Team," to denote a tightly knit team of powerful men from the CIA, the National Security Council and the Pentagon which, he states, has conspired, maneuvered and organized para-military operations to tighten its stranglehold on U.S. government policy.

Prouty not only charges that it was this Secret team which maneuvered the U.S. into the Vietnam war but hints that the group may have played a part in the assassination of President John Kennedy after it learned that Kennedy planned to destroy the ST.

So alarming are the charges made by Prouty that a reader is tempted to hope it is all a work of fic-

tion rather than fact, but on page after page one is constantly reminded that this is real history the author is talking about.

"The conflict in Vietnam stands as a costly and frightening example of how the U.S. military force can be drawn into an operation in pursuit of the unconventional para-military activities of the CIA," writes Prouty.

Prouty zeroes in on the late Allen Dulles, director of CIA for eight years, as the man who did the most to change the CIA from its original and only legally assigned task of coordinating intelligence into an agency up to its ears in creating revolutions, changing governments and changing history.

Prouty points to Dulles' own book, "The Craft of Intelligence," published in 1961 after he retired, as, "no more than a final compilation of all the soothing syrup and old wives tales Allen Dulles concocted and poured over the fevered brows of men in high office for 25 years."

One of the most devastating charges made by Prouty is that the so-called "Illegal" release of the "Pentagon Papers" was actually engineered by the CIA itself, in an effort to disengage that agency from responsibility for the Vietnam war.

"It is quite fantastic to find people like Daniel Ellsberg being charged with releasing official secrets simply because the labels on a piece of paper said 'Top Secret,' when the substance of many of the words written on those papers was patently untrue and no more than a cover story. Except for the fact that they were official lies, these papers had no basis in fact," writes Prouty.

Prouty charges that Dulles himself, while director of the

CIA, leaked to the press many stories taken from "Top Secret" files when such leaking served his purpose.

Prouty points out that when the CIA was first formed, under a law signed by the late President Harry Truman, it was given by law only one task, the coordination of intelligence, and was never even authorized to collect intelligence.

He then quotes Truman as saying, a few days after the assassination of President Kennedy, in 1963, "For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the Government. I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it be injected into peace-time cloak-and-dagger operations."

The former president then added that the CIA had become "a symbol of sinister and mysterious intrigue."

"Who knows what thoughts passed through his (Truman's) mind during those thirty days from Nov. 22, to Dec. 22, in 1963, thoughts that led him to write those powerful and intense words?" asks Prouty.

Turning to Kennedy and that assassination, Prouty writes that the young President had been thoroughly scorched by the Bay of Pigs incident and after determining that the CIA had been responsible for the entire fiasco, bringing universal world condemnation of the U.S., Kennedy vowed that, "Sometime during his administration the genie of clandestine operations would have to be put back into the bottle."

Then, turning to the assassination itself, Prouty writes, "For those who have the one-man theory of the Warren Commission, there is in

evidence more than enough pressure from any one of several groups, or their more radical sub-groups, to support the germ of the idea that a sinister conspiracy may have arisen from these pressures. For these groups realized that Kennedy was gaining real knowledge, ex-

perience and political power and that he had to be removed from office before winning the inevitable mandate from the U.S. public which was certain to be his in 1964."

Prouty states that it was Allen Dulles who had a large hand in the writing of the Warren Report.

Then, writes Prouty, "The Secret Team machine, always at its most active and insidious best in adversity, surged forward in the post-Kennedy void. The record shows that Johnson (President Johnson) almost never said no."

Prouty states that the CIA and the ST played a decisive role in historic events in Jordan, Guatemala, the Philippines, Indonesia and the Dominican Republic, as well as its well-known roles in the Bay of Pigs fiasco and, finally, Vietnam.

Some of these operations, when uncovered by the countries involved, resulted in the U.S. government being forced to pay blackmail to the tune of millions, often in military equipment, all without the U.S. public being informed.

Keeping the U.S. public in the dark about these operations, under the guise of "security," was all really a big joke, says Prouty, because all the world, including Russia and China, always knew what was going on.

Continued

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Budget Knife Applied to CIA

The critics of President Nixon who complain he is only chopping at social service programs to bring government spending back within budget bounds should look at what is happening to the Central Intelligence Agency.

This is somewhat difficult to do in light of the secrecy surrounding the CIA. What is known, however, is that CIA budgets have increased over the years to about \$4.5 billion. Much of this is attributable to the sophisticated spy equipment now being used to ferret out what is going on in other countries. The satellites which can detect movements at missile sites do not come cheap.

Even so, the CIA has been singled out by President Nixon as an agency which will receive the same budget knife treatment which is being given to Health, Education and Welfare by Casper Weinberger. In the case of the CIA, the knife-wielder is James Schlesinger, who established himself as a skilled administrator as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Once again, the President has headed an important agency with an administrator skilled in management rather than the programs of the agency.

There is resentment within the CIA at the abrupt dismissal of Director Richard Helms, who maintained the Allen Dulles tradition.

The public is in no position to judge whether the CIA has grown flabby. The public cannot know to what extent Schlesinger will "Nixonize" the CIA, although Schlesinger's past record of independent judgment minimizes this.

What seems certain, with the reduction of over 1,000 employees since Schlesinger's arrival, is that President Nixon is looking with concern at the CIA's \$4.5 billion annual expenditure

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COLONEL FLETCHER PROUTY INTERVIEWED

JOHN HART: Before he retired, Air Force Col. Fletcher Prouty spent a lot of his military career as what is called the focal point officer between the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. He's written a book which is highly critical of what he calls The Secret Team, which by the way is the title of the book. Since there are frequent references in the book to information in the Pentagon Papers, CBS News correspondent Fred Graham, who's been covering the Daniel Ellsberg trial, has joined me for the interview.

Col. Prouty, I'd like to ask you first, what is the secret team?

COL. FLETCHER PROUTY: You know, there are quite a few people who write about the CIA, and Mr. Dulles has written about CIA; Lyman Kirkpatrick has written about CIA. The secret team really is the CIA and other parts of the government. The secret team includes, for instance, the participation of the Defense Department, of the White House, offices such as today we have under Dr. Kissinger. I think it's important to point out that in the operational aspects of CIA work, the participation of a major part of the government, not just CIA is an important consideration.

HART: Well, the secret team's part in such things as the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem, that sort of thing, the ITT-CIA involvement--alleged involvement--in the election in Chile are pretty well documented. Can you tell us anything about what you think may be going on right now?



PROUTY: You mean current operations?

HART: That's right, yes.

PROUTY: Actually, most of the things that I knew in current operations ended with my retirement about ten years ago.

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